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Abstract 
The European Union service sector hampers many regulations by the Member 
States. For this reason, the European Commission issued a directive to reduce 
regulations and raise competition. We update the study from Kox, Lejour and 
Montizaan (2005) with the latest changes of the directive on services o the internal 
market. Based on OECD-Panel data, we are able to develop a linear service trade 
model to investigate the economic benefit of such a directive. Our results show that 
the volume of service trade would decline with a between 2.6%-5.4%. This surprising 
outcome is contrary to previous results from Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2005) or 
Breuss and Badinger (2005). We show that this is due to the latest modification in the 
service directive. 
 
Keywords: Regulatory Barriers; OECD Panel Data; Service Trade; European Union 
 
JEL classification codes: C23, F12, O52 
 Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
  3
                                                
Introduction 
For most European Union (EU) Member States
1, services have been found to 
be important for economic growth and account for 70% of GDP and employment 
(European Parliament 2006). Despite this fact, barriers still hamper the internal 
market for services of the EU. To overcome these barriers, the European Parliament 
issued a directive on services in December 2006 with the aim to remove such barriers. 
This paper investigates the potential economic benefit that would result from 
the implementation of this directive. In order to test this, a linear service trade model, 
based on an economic gravity equation and monopolistic competition theory, is 
introduced. Using indicators for the quantity of national regulations in the calculation 
reveals the impact of these regulations on the internal service trade. Applying the 
directive on these indicators will reveal the effect of the directive on the service trade 
in the EU. 
 
 
1 Note that European Union Member States and Member States will be used interchangeably 
throughout this article. Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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1 Background Information 
In March 2000, the European Council held a special meeting in Lisbon. The 
aim of the meeting was “to agree on a new strategic goal for the Union in order to 
strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion as a part of a 
knowledge-based economy” (Lisbon European Council 2000, introduction). An 
important point from this meeting was the discussion about an economic reform for 
the internal market. They decided, “to set out by the end of 2000 a strategy for the 
removal of barriers to services” (Lisbon European Council 2000, point 17). 
In December 2000, the European Commission issued a strategy-paper for the 
internal market for services (European Commission 2000), which contains a two 
stage approach for the removal of regulation barriers. The first stage analyses the 
internal market and identifies barriers to the free movement of services. A report by 
the Commission of the European Communities (European Commission 2002) 
concluded this first stage. The report summarises barriers to the internal market for 
services, the common features of the legal barriers and the impact of the barriers. The 
aim of the second stage of the approach is to develop appropriate solutions for the 
barriers identified in Stage 1. Issuing a proposal for a directive on services (European 
Commission 2004) accomplished this second stage. The proposed directive provides 
a legal framework encompassed of 47 articles to eliminate obstacles for the freedom 
of establishment and the free movement of services and to raise the mutual trust 
between EU Member States. 
In April 2006, the European Commission issued an amended proposal of the Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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directive (European Commission 2006), and in December 2006, they issued the final 
directive on services (European Parliament 2006). 
 
2 The Internal European Market for Services 
The service sector of the EU in 2003 encompassed around 65% of the total 
GDP and around 68% of the total employment of the Member States. Table 1, which 
is based on a study by Vogt (2005), shows that the shares from total GDP of the 12 
EU Member States varies from 50% for Ireland, up to 92.7% for Luxembourg. The 
service shares on total employment are higher and their variation is lower than the 
ones for GDP. They stretch from 59.7% for Portugal up to 77.7% for Netherlands. 
Despite these high values, the shares for services in the EU were approximately 11% 
less than those in the UK and the USA. 
 
**** TABLE 1 **** 
 
The European Commission (2003) has also described other significant characteristics 
of cross-border service activities. They mention that services account for just 20% of 
trade in the internal market, even though 90% of Small and Middle Enterprises 
(SME) are service industries. In addition, 40 % of business services providers say that 
eliminating barriers to cross-border trade would increase revenues by up to 20%. Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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2.1 Barriers 
Barriers for the internal market for services, hinders providers and consumers 
to benefit from an open internal market and unlimited competition. These barriers can 
be derived from both legal and non-legal factors ( European Commission 2002). 
Legal barriers contain quantitative restrictions, residence and/ or registration 
requirements. There are many examples of this. Some Member States could fail to 
recognize that requirements were met, if a service provider in another Member State 
did them. Administrative burdens and prior authorisation of certain services could 
hamper the promotion of services. The requirement that providers must have an 
establishment in the Member State in which they deliver services could also hinder 
the distribution of services. Other barriers include the formation and the content of 
contracts, price regulations, rules and practices, in relation to payment and accounting 
rules. There could be differences between Member States in terms of rates, 
obligations, procedures or forms, which result in difficulties for intra-European trade. 
Professional liability insurance schemes, which may vary between Member States, 
could also hamper cross-border service trade. 
Non-legal barriers arise due to lack of information or differences in culture 
between Member States. Thereby, missing knowledge about rights, applicable 
national rules, competent authorities, procedures and formalities could relate to a lack 
of information. Commercial and consumer habits, which derive from the difference in 
language, values and habits of a specific country, could also cause difficulties. 
 Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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2.2 EU Service Directive 
In 2006, the European Parliament issued a final directive on services in the 
internal market (European Parliament 2006). The aim of this directive is to reduce 
barriers of the internal market for services of the EU, described in the report by the 
European Commission. The directive contains measures that target to simplify 
administration, reduce barriers to the freedom of establishment, reduce the free 
movement of services, and increase the quality of services and administrative 
cooperation. It is a dynamical approach with time for the removal of barriers and 
evaluation to achieve a genuine internal market for services by 2010 (European 
Parliament 2006, point (7), p. L.376/37). 
2.3 Application of the Monopolistic Competition Theory 
To test if the theory of monopolistic competition can applied to the internal 
market for services of the EU, the characteristics of this market must be the same as 
the one of monopolistic competition. That means product differentiation, economies 
of scale, and barriers to entry should exist in the internal market. If they exist, then a 
reduction of barriers to entry could induce other enterprises to enter the market, 
potentially leading to more competition with increasing quantity of products, 
decreasing product prices and raising demand. 
Product differentiation in services is an important strategical factor for all 
companies, because it accounts for most of the cost. Companies use services for 
communications, transportation, health care, wholesale and retail distribution, and 
financial services (Quinn, Doorley and Paquette 1990, p. 58). It also creates Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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additional value for customers, and it is reasonable to assume that if customers are 
satisfied with the quality of services or the service products of a company, they will 
remain a loyal customer of this company. Furthermore, it is also a condition for the 
service industries to have a sustainable competitive advantage. A sustainable 
company advantage exists when resources or skills for services are valuable, rare, 
inimitable and when there is no strategically equivalent substitute (Bharadwaj, 
Varadarajan and Fahy 1993, p. 84). These requirements describe product 
differentiation. 
Economies of scale involves decreasing average production costs by 
increasing the scale of production, or learning by doing. Various studies have proved 
the existence of such learning by doing procedures in the service sector (e.g. von 
Hippel and Tyre 1999; Canback 1998). According to Cezanne (2006, p. 164) and 
Cezanne and Weber (2005), obstacles to enter a market can be institutional or 
economical barriers, such as import restrictions, governmental restrictions and sunk 
costs. These costs are the difference of acquirement costs to the value of resale of 
necessary fixed costs for a market entry or lack of information. 
The report made by the European Commission (2002) describes such barriers. 
As mentioned in chapter two of that report, many legal and non-legal barriers to entry 
exist in the Member States, whereby legal barriers correspond to institutional barriers. 
As an example, there are quantitative restrictions for the establishment of service 
providers in Member States other than their state of origin. Member States can limit 
the number of service providers or require registration. Economic barriers arise from 
the institutional or legal barriers. These barriers lead to (higher) transaction costs, Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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which, in turn, lead to higher average costs and higher prices. They also represent 
sunk costs. The existence of these institutional and economic barriers leads to limited 
competition on national service markets, and on the internal market for services, 
which consists of these national markets. 
The above-mentioned requirements of monopolistic competition actually exist 
currently on the internal market for services of the EU, as we have proven so far. To 
take this theory one step further, a reduction of barriers to entry will encourage other 
enterprises to enter the market, which would lead to more competition. Through the 
implementation of the directive on services with the aim to reduce barriers to entry of 
the Member States, competition on the internal market for services could raise and 
the national service markets of the Member States could become more contestable 
markets. Following this approach, there should be a negative connection between 
barriers to entry and service trade: the assumption is that the lower the barriers, the 
higher the amount of trade in the service industry. 
2.4 Regulatory Indicators 
In 2003, the OECD released a ‘Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire’ to 
analyse product market regulations in the OECD countries. Several governmental 
administrations answered took part. The questionnaire covered general regulatory 
framework policies and specific regulations in many sectors. The OECD sent the 
questionnaire to all OECD Member States and their representatives. 
The responses from the questionnaire encouraged the creation of the OECD 
International Regulation Database (2003). This database classifies regulation data Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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into high-level, mid-level and low-level indicators. Figure 1 represents this 
classification for high-level and mid-level indicators. 
 
**** FIGURE 1 **** 
 
Classification (Figure 1) divides regulations in two high-level indicators: 
inward- and outward-oriented policies. Furthermore, the indicator inward-oriented 
policies are divided in two mid-level indicators: state control and barriers to 
entrepreneurship. The mid-level indicator of outward-oriented policies is barriers to 
trade and investment. For further analysis, these mid-level indicators are divided in 
sub-domains (see figure 2). State control represents the sub-domains of public 
ownership and involvement in business operations. The sub-domains of barriers to 
entrepreneurship are regulatory and administrative opacity, administrative burdens 
on start-up and barriers to competition. The sub-domains of barriers to trade and 
investment are explicit barriers to trade and investment and other barriers. 
 
**** FIGURE 2 **** 
 
Following the structure of the OECD database with sub-domains of the mid-
level indicators, table 2 gives a detailed summary of the collected items per sub-
domain. In total, there are 124 items answered by representatives from OECD Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
countries. The sub-domains of public ownership with 22.58% and involvement in 
business operation with 16.13% sum to 38.71%. This represents the mid-level 
indicator state control. The mid-level indicator barriers to entrepreneurship total 
47.58% (8.87% for regulatory and administrative opacity, 17.74% for administrative 
burdens on start-up, and 20.97% for barriers to competition). The remaining 13.71% 
belongs to the mid-level indicator barriers to trade and investment, consisting of 
10.48% for explicit barriers to trade and investment, and 3.23% for other barriers. 
It is important to note that the indicator other barriers contains only 3.23% of 
all data, which are four items from the 124. This may not be representative for this 
indicator. Therefore, subsequent calculations do not consider this sub-domain. 
 
**** TABLE 2 **** 
 
We apply the methodology for bilateral regulatory indicators, described in the 
annex, on the data from the OECD. The comparison contains 15 EU Member States, 
namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Calculating the average regulatory indicator per country pair gives comparable values 
for each Member State. 
The average indicator is: 
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K    represents the number of items per domain/sub-domain.   
is a bilateral regulatory indicator at question m with the way s of dealing with the 
question for the country pair i and j. The assignment of values to this bilateral 
regulatory indicator is as follows: if two countries differ at Yes-or-No, or a) or b) 
questions, the actual indicator gets the value 1; otherwise, if they have the same 
answer, it gets the value 0. If the question allows for more than two answers, then the 
indicator gets the value 1 if there is a total difference between the two countries. 
Otherwise, the indicator gets a value between 0 and 1, depending on how many 
answers these questions allow and how much do the answers of the two countries 
differ. E.g., if there are three possible answers to one question, and both countries 
have one identical and one different answer, then the indicator gets the value 0.66. If 
the answers are numbers, then if the destination country has the highest number of all 
countries, the indicator gets the value one. The indicators for the other country pairs 
get a value between zero and one, which depends on the number of the destination 
country in relation to the highest number. 




The assigning of values for the average regulatory indicator for each question 
per country pair builds up for the 15 Member States. The result is a 90x124 matrix, 
because of the combination of Belgium and Luxembourg, due to missing data for 
Luxembourg. 
For the calculation of the average indicator, the values are summed up for 
each sub-domain per country pair. Dividing the sums by K , the count of all questions 
in the actual sub-domain gives the average regulatory indicators per country pair for 
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each sub-domain. These indicators take values between 0 and 1, and the values for 
the country pairs are comparable for each sub-domain. Following this structure, the 
average indicators for all pairs of the 15 Member States per sub-domain are 
calculated (the sub-domain ‘other barriers’ is left out). An example of the 
construction of the   is shown in table 3.  ARICP
 
**** TABLE 3 **** 
 
2.5 The Impact of the Service Directive 
The estimation of the impact of the directive on services uses the sub-domain 
structure of the data. Three impact cases appear:  
-  the directive affects the comparison item and leads to less heterogeneity;  
-  the directive could affect the item and lead to less heterogeneity; and  
-  the directive does not affect the item. 
The second case leads to the creation of a bandwidth with a minimum and 
maximum effect. Applying the directive on the data and considering the three cases, 
results in the calculation of two new matrices, each with the dimension 90x124, one 
for the calculation of the minimum effect of the directive and the second for the 
calculation of the maximum effect. Table 4 gives the bandwidth of the impact of the 
directive per domain/sub-domain. 
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The directive on services affects the sub-domain regulatory and administrative 
opacity heavily, with a possible reduction from 79% to 91%. Public ownership, 
involvement in business operation, administrative burdens on start-up and explicit 
barriers to trade and investment are moderately affected. Public ownership could 
decline by 11% and involvement in business operations by 0% to 23%. The possible 
reduction of administrative burdens on start-up takes values from 0% to 15% and the 
sub-domain of explicit barriers to trade and investment is around 17%. Barriers to 
competition are not affected. The directive could lead to a total reduction of barriers 
by 11% to 19%. 
 
**** TABLE 4 **** 
 
3 Model and Data 









G F =  
where 
ij F   is the Flow from Origin i to Destination    j
j i M M , is the Relevant Economic Sizes of the Origin and Destination 
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ij D   is the Distance Between the Two Entities 
G   is a Constant  
To apply this equation on the internal market for services of the EU, bilateral 
service trade represents the flow from the country of origin to destination country. 
The GDP of both countries gives an indication of their economies of size. If we use 
this notation and apply the natural logarithm on the gravity equation, we get the linear 
equation: 
(3)  ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ij j i ij D GDP GDP G BST δ β α − + + = . 
where: 
ij BST   is the Bilateral Service Trade from Country   to Country    i j
i GDP   is the Gross Domestic Product of the Origin Country i 
j GDP   is the Gross Domestic Product of the Destination Country    j
ij D   is the Distance Between Country i and Country    j
G   is a Constant  
The next step is the augmentation of this equation with the average regulatory 
indicators. This is necessary for the estimation of the impact of the directive on 
bilateral service trade between the Member States. The monopolistic competition 
theory gives the theoretical foundation of this augmentation, as it describes a link 
between barriers to entry and trade. In our study, the average regulatory indicators per 
country pair represent barriers to entry for the internal market for services. Reducing 
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these barriers leads to more competition with more service trade and lower product 
prices. That means that reducing average regulatory indicators should raise 
competition, whereby bilateral service trade should increase. This is because actual 
regulations hamper foreign service providers more than native providers, and a 
reduction of these regulations attracts more foreign providers to enter domestic 
markets and to participate in the competition. 
Because the estimation of the impact of the directive is based on data for three 
different years (2001 to 2003), this augmentation also introduces two dummy 
variables. These help to distinguish the data for different years.  
The linear service trade model is represented by the following equation: 
(4) 
ij ij j i ij RAO IBO PO D GDP GDP G BST 3 2 1 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( χ χ χ δ β α + + + − + + =
  ij ij ij ij Year Year EBTI BC ABS ε χ χ χ χ χ + + + + + + 2003 2002 8 7 6 5 4  
where: 
PO    is the Indicator for Public Ownership 
IBO    is the Indicator for Involvement in Business Operation 
RAO    is the Indicator for Regulatory and Administrative Opacity 
ABS     is the Indicator for Administrative Burdens on Start-up 
BC     is the Indicator for Barriers to Competition 
EBTI     is the Indicator for Explicit Barriers to Trade and Investment 
  16Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
2002 Year   is the Dummy Variable for the year 2002 
2003 Year   is the Dummy Variable for the year 2003 
ij ε     is a Residual Variable 
The residual variable represents influences on bilateral service trade by other 
than the described variables. The  l χ  ( 9 ,..., 1 = l ) are the coefficients of the average 
regulatory indicators. These, the constant term   , and the coefficients  ) ln(G δ β α , ,  
will be estimated in the next section. 
The data for bilateral service trade comes from the OECD and stretches from 
2001 to 2003. Belgium and Luxembourg represent a special case, because there isn’t 
much separate data for them. In these countries, the data is merged and appears as 
data for Belgium-Luxembourg. Data for bilateral import and export of services exists 
for all countries, but it can vary because of the use of different data sources. Some 
data is missing because not all 15 EU Member States report bilateral service trade for 
all years. There is missing data for Belgium-Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. 
Data about the GDP comes from the World Economic Outlook Database kept 
by the International Monetary Fund, and the distance data are a result of 
investigations by CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2006). The regulatory indicators are 
based on the results of the questionnaire by the OECD, as mentioned before. 
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4 Estimation of the Model 
Before the coefficients of the linear service trade model are calculated, we can 
make some predictions. The signs of the coefficients of the logarithm of the GDP 
variables and the logarithm of the distance should be positive, whereas the coefficient 
of the distance variable should be negative, in accordance to the definition of 
economic gravity equations. The regression uses only the data and no defined 
equation, and because of this, the coefficient of the distance variable should be 
negative. This would prove the negative connection between the logarithm of the 
distance and the logarithm of bilateral service trade, defined in the linear service trade 
model. Furthermore, due to application of the monopolistic competition theory, the 
connection between the average regulatory indicators per sub-domain and bilateral 
service trade should be negative. 
We will present, in what follows, the calculation of the coefficient for each 
variable. Beside the calculation of the coefficients, values for a significance test are 
also calculated. The null hypothesis of this significance test is that the true coefficient 
is not significantly different from zero, which means that if the calculated 
significance value is lower than 5%, then the true coefficient is significantly different 
from zero. The estimation is a linear regression performed with the original least 
square method.  
To picture the evaluation of the internal market for services, this investigation 
contains the period from 2001 to 2003 and the period from 1999 to 2001. Table 5 
shows the results of this regression. Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
  19
From Table 5, we see that for the logged variables, both estimations show the 
predicted signs. The coefficients of the logarithmic variables of GDP have positive 
signs and lie around 0.75. The coefficients of the logarithm of distance show the 
predicted negative sign and are close to -1.15. In addition, all these coefficients are 
significant, which means that the true coefficients are significantly different from 
zero, and because of this, the likelihood that the estimated coefficients are close to the 
true coefficients is high. The coefficients of the regulatory indicators have different 
signs, opposite to the previous estimations from other authors (Breuss and Badinger 
2005; Kox, Lejour and Montizaan 2005). From there, it is assumed that all regulatory 
indicators hamper service trade and, due to this, have negative coefficients. Public 
ownership, involvement in business operation and explicit barriers to trade and 
investment have positive parameters for both estimations, and regulatory and 
administrative opacity, administrative barriers on start-up and barriers to competition 
have negative signs at both periods. Some of the coefficients are significant, and 
these, which are not significant, are close to zero. Not significant means only that the 
true parameter is not significantly different from zero and then an estimated low 
parameter could be close to the true coefficient. 
We can then evaluate the market by estimating the periods between 1999-
2001 and 2001-2003. We find that the parameter of the logged variables declined 
during these two time periods. This means that the variables’ effect on bilateral 
service trade sunk. The coefficients of public ownership, involvement in business 
operation and regulatory and administrative opacity increased, whereby the parameter 
of administrative burdens on start-up, barriers to competition and explicit barriers to Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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trade and investment decreased. Three of the six raised parameters mean that the 
negative impact of national regulations becomes lower, and the two variables of these 
three with positive parameters are counterproductive and support service trade. The 
increase in parameter values shows that the effect of the directive on service sinks. 
When we look at the two positive coefficients, we find the effect of the directive 
becomes negative, and through its application, service trade would decline. 
 
**** TABLE 5 **** 
 
Using the linear service trade model with the parameters for the period of 
2001 to 2003, and calculating bilateral service trade, reveals the most up to date effect 
of the directive on services. Calculating service trade with the original data gives the 
actual service trade, and other influences than the ones explicitly used are left out. 
Using the new values of the average regulatory indicators with the applied directive, 
and no other modified data, results in comparable values for bilateral service trade. 
Only data for 2003 is used to have a complete year, which serves as basis for 
estimating the effect of the directive on services. 
Table 6 summarizes these estimated effects. Overall, service trade would 
decrease as a result of the implementation of the directive on service. The trade 
volume would decline by values between -2.2% to -7.9% or around -8.08 Million. 
USD to -28.87 Million USD (the calculated total service trade of the 15 Member 
States was 363.16 Million USD). The reasons behind this surprising result are the Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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decreasing effects of public ownership, involvement in business operation and 
explicit barriers to trade and investment. Regulatory and administrative barriers and 
administrative barriers on start-up cannot match this effect. The barriers to 
competition are not affected by the directive and have no effect on bilateral service 
trade. The calculated service trade of the Member States in 2003 was 364.58 Million 
USD. 
 
**** TABLE 6 **** 
 
If we take into consideration the period between 1999 to 2001 and the year 
2001 as basis for analysing the changes due to the directive, we can see that the effect 
is a positive one (Table 6). This indicates a development of the market for service to 
become more open. It seems that old regulations could be modified without 
governmental intervention.  
Figure 3 shows the calculated bilateral service trade of the Member States 
from 2001 to 2003. For 2003, the figure compares the calculated value for service 
trade without the directive with the estimated values for service trade, which contains 
the minimum and the maximum effects of the implemented directive. 
The trade volume of services would be smaller, as a result of the applied 
directive. The calculated trade volume without the directive accounts for 363.16 
Million USD, and the values for the minimum and the maximum effect account for Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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355.07 Million USD (minimum effect) and 334.28 Million USD (maximum effect). 
 
**** FIGURE 3 **** 
 
In short, this part shows the opposite effect of the assumed, theoretical, effect 
of the directive on service trade. In theory, a reduction of barriers to entry of service 
providers leads to more competition, which could encourage higher trade. This 
investigation shows that the application of the directive on services, which reduces 
regulatory barriers, decreases service trade between the regarded Member States. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
The internal service sector of the EU is crucial for the European economy. 
Services make up around 70% of total GDP and employment in the Member States, 
as well as of the EU itself. Service trade alone is important, as it accounts for 20% of 
the trade on the internal European market. As a report made by the European 
Commission shows, the national regulations by the Member States hamper service 
trade. To make these regulations more flexible, the European Parliament issued a 
directive on service, with the desired effect of an increase in the service trade. 
Other studies by Breuss and Badinger (2005), Copenhagen Economics (2005) 
and Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2005), estimated an increasing effect for service 
trade, growth or employment, but these studies used pre-2002 data (Breuss and Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
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Badinger) for the period of 1999 to 2001 (Kox, Lejour and Montizaan). This study 
investigates the economic effects of the final directive on services from 2006, 
particularly the effect on service trade on the internal European market on services. 
To test its assumptions, the present research develops a linear service trade model 
based on the monopolistic competition theory and economic gravity equations. We 
introduce regulatory indicators to calculate the level of regulations of the Member 
States and we use those indicators to estimate the effect of the directive on service 
trade. Using data from 15 Member States for the period of 2001 to 2003 shows that 
the application of the directive would cause a negative economic effect on service 
trade in the short run. By application of the directive, internal service trade would 
decrease by a value between 2.2% to 7.9%. 
The other studies, together with the present study’s estimations for the period 
of 1999 to 2001 and 2001 to 2003, show that the estimated positive effect on service 
trade of the Member States, due to the implementation of the directive is not as 
expected, and that the effect might indeed be a negative one. The application of the 
directive could hamper the development of the market for services, because it would 
open the market. 
The development of the directive on services is crucial and may influence the 
results of all mentioned studies. Furthermore, data from new Member States could 
change the estimated effects. These states can provide simpler services, with low 
wages and lower prices compared to the old Member States. By opening the national 
service markets, foreign providers could replace domestic providers for these specific 
services. This is why critics of the directive fear that its implementation could cause Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
social dumping and raise unemployment. 
This study treats services as homogenous, but in reality, services differ by 
their type. The implementation of the directive could raise competition in simple 
services more than in complex services, which need more knowledge, education or 
infrastructure. We advise that the development of the national service markets and the 
implementation of the directive on services be explored further. In addition, the 
economic effect of the directive itself in the long run is unclear and needs further 
analyses. 
 
Appendix: Methodology for Regulatory Indicators 
The indicators are bilateral, which means that they consider only two 
countries at the same time. The idea behind this is that service providers want to offer 
their services in other Member States and have to comply to different national 
regulations - those of their country of origin and those of the destination country. 
The development of these bilateral regulatory indicators used the results of a 
questionnaire by the OECD (2003). In that questionnaire, OECD asked countries 
about their regulatory structures and policies. The methodology uses only Yes-or-No-
Questions. These questions have no dimension, and to evaluate them numerically is 
impossible. Comparing the answers of two countries leads to a binary structure. Two 
countries can have identical or non-identical answers at one compared item. 
Let  be the different countries, and an item or question     where two  n k ) ( N k ∈
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countries differ or not. The bilateral regulatory indicator   gets the value 0 at 
item   if the answers of the countries   and   are similar, or the value 1 if they are 




(5)  ,  .  } 1 , 0 { =
k
ij BRI ) ,..., 1 ( , n j i ∈ ∀
All binary information for one item can be summarized in a bilateral 
regulatory matrix
k BRM . For the case of four countries,   this matrix looks 
like: 
) , , , ( d c b a





































A comparison of a country with itself does not make sense, and only a one-
way comparison is necessary. The chronological order of the compared countries 
does not matter for the assigned value. If there is high dissimilarity between the 
countries, then the matrix has many entries with the value one. 
The database of the OECD contains more than one question, which induces 
the development of a more complex bilateral regulatory matrix. Note that the 
countries differ in    m )) ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 ( }, ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 { ( N K k k k K k k k m ∈ ∈  items. This leads 
to the following bilateral regulatory matrix: 
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Furthermore, the countries may have    s
)) ,..., 4 , 2 , 1 ( }, ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 { ( N S s s s S s s s s ∈ ∈  different qualitative ways of dealing with a 
particular item . The number of s may differ from one item to another, but it cannot 
be higher than the total number of compared countries. At a maximum, each country 
can have a different s than the other countries.   is the maximum number of ways in 
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Not all items may differ by the number of ways and there are many items with 
a binary nature. Thereby, the matrix 
ms BRM  contains several sub-matrices with zero 
values. Summarizing the values of each item for a country pair leads to the bilateral 
regulatory indicators per country pair .  ) ( ij RICP
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(9)    ∑∑ =
sm
s m
ij ij BRI RICP
,
These indicators divided through the count of items leads to the average 









These average indicators are useful for the comparison of national regulations 
between different countries. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1 
SHARE OF SERVICES ON GDP AND EMPLOYMENT OF 2003 
Source: Vogt (2005, p. 5) 
Country  Services in % in share 
of total GDP 
Services in % in share 
of total Employment 
Austria 60.4  63.2 
Belgium 68.6  76.0 
Finland 58.5  68.7 
France 67.9  73.9 
Germany 65.3  70.4 
Greece 64.5  60.9 
Ireland 50.0  65.8 
Italy 66.4 66.5 
Luxembourg 92.7  77.2 
Netherlands 67.5  77.7 
Portugal 63.0  59.7 
Spain 63.9  65.3 
Euro area  65.6  68.3 
United Kingdom  68.6  80.6 
United States  71.5  81.1 
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TABLE 2 
COLLECTED ITEMS IN THE OECD REGULATION DATABASE 
Domain Sub-Domain 
Number of 
Items in the 
Database 
Weight of total 
Number of 
Items 
Public Ownership  28  22.58% 
Involvement in 
Business Operation  20 16.13%  State Control 
 48  38.71% 
Regulatory and 
Administrative Opacity  11 8.87% 
Administrative 
Burdens on Start-up  22 17.74% 
Barriers to Competition 26  20.97% 
Barriers to 
Entrepreneurship 
 59  47.58% 
Explicit Barriers to 
Trade and Investment  13 10.48% 
Other Barriers  4  3.23%  Barriers to Trade 
and Investment 
  17 13.71% 
 Total  124  100% 
Source: CONWAY, JANOD and NICOLETTI (2005) Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
  34
TABLE 3 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE AVERAGE REGULATORY INDICATORS 




Value  Count  Value of 
ARICP 
Are the prices of domestic 
airfares regulated in any 
way? 
Yes No  1  1  1 
The level of government at 
which shopping hours 
regulations are set is : 
i) National 





National 0.33  2  0.665 
How many different public 
and private bodies would an 
entrepreneur need to 
contact to register a public 
limited company (pre-
registration + registration)? 
25 10  0.4  3  0,5766 
Source: CONWAY, JANOD and NICOLETTI (2005) 
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TABLE 4 
EFFECT OF THE DIRECTIVE ON SERVICES ON REGULATORY BARRIERS  
Sub-Domain 
Reduction of Regulatory 
Barriers through the Application of the 
Service Directive 
Public Ownership  11% 
Involvement in Business Operation  0% - 23% 
Regulatory and Administrative 
Opacity  79% - 91% 
Administrative Burdens on Start-up  0% - 15% 
Barriers to Competition  0% 
Explicit Barriers to Trade and 
Investment  17% 
Total Reduction  11% - 19% 
Source: own calculations 
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TABLE 5 
RESULT OF THE LINEAR SERVICE TRADE MODEL REGRESSION 
Coefficient  
{of the Variable}  Period 1999 to 2001  Period 2001 to 2003 
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R² 0.86  0.84 
a) estimated Coefficient 
(value of the significance test) 
The significance level is 5% and each variable contains 469 
values. 
Source: own calculation 
 
TABLE 6 
EFFECTS OF THE DIRECTIVE ON SERVICES ON THE BILATERAL SERVICE 
TRADE, CHANGES BASED ON 2003 
Effect on Bilateral Service Trade 
Domain/ Sub-Domain 
Minimum Effect  Maximum Effect 
Due to Public Ownership  -1.6% 
Due to Involvement in 
Business Operation  0% -7.5% 
Due to Regulatory and 
Administrative Opacity  +2% +2.3% 
Due to Administrative 
Burdens on Start-up  0% +1.4% 
Due to Barriers to 
Competition  No Effect 
Due to Explicit Barriers 
to Trade and Investment  -2.5% 
Total Effect (2003)  -2.2%  -7.9% 
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Total Effect based 
on the older period 1999 
to 2001, changes base on 
2001 
+19.9% +21.5% 
Source: own calculation Weber and Asmus  The Internal Market for Services of the European Union 
Figures 
FIGURE 1 















Source: Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005) 
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FIGURE 2 
MID_LEVEL INDICATORS DIVIDED IN DOMAINS AND SUB_DOMAINS 
Barriers to 
Entrepreneurship




















Source: Conway, P., Janod, V. and Nicoletti, G. (2005) 
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FIGURE 3 
BILATERAL SERVICE TRADE WITH APPLIED DIRECTIVE ON SERVICES 








2001 2002 2003 Year
Mio. US$
Calculated Values Minimum Effect Maximum Effect
 
Source: own calculation according to Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005) 
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